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ISSUES REGARDING THE MOST EFFECTIVE TOOL OF U.S. BANKRUPTCY LAW: 
‘THE AUTOMATIC STAY’  
by 
ZEENAT KERA  
(Under the Direction of Professor Lorie Johnson) 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses three areas in which there have been important developments 
concerning the automatic stay of the U.S. Bankruptcy law, provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362.  The 
first part of the thesis addresses and analyses the question whether state courts have jurisdiction 
to determine their own jurisdiction when the automatic stay is at issue.  The consensus, however, 
now seems to favor the traditional and correct view, that while bankruptcy courts alone have 
jurisdiction to lift or modify the stay, state courts, have jurisdiction to determine whether the stay 
does or does not cut off its jurisdiction to reach the merits of a case.  The second topic is whether 
a state court has jurisdiction to impose sanctions for an alleged violation of the stay.  The 
analysis, with the help of case laws will show that even if a state court or another federal court 
has jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies, only the bankruptcy court where the case 
is pending has jurisdiction to impose sanctions for violating the stay.  The third part of the thesis 
explains and analyses issues concerning repossession of property by a creditor before the filing 
of a bankruptcy petition. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Automatic Stay, Issues, Jurisdiction, State Court, Bankruptcy Court, Stay 
Violation, Creditor, Repossession, Bankruptcy Petition 
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I.   INTRODUCTION TO BANKRUPTCY LAW: 
The term bankruptcy law is generally used to refer to federal law- title 11 of the United 
States Code, commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code.1  The current law became effective 
October 1, 1979, after President Carter signed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on November 
1978.2  This Act has been amended on many occasions, the three major amendments being the 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984; Bankruptcy Judges, United States 
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986; and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.3 
 
Bankruptcy Code- 
The Bankruptcy Code is comprised of eight chapters that follow odd numbers- 1, 3, 5, 7, 
11, and 13 with the addition of Chapter 12 for family farmers in the year 1986.4  Chapters 1, 3, 5, 
contain provisions of general applicability in all types of bankruptcy cases.5  The Chapters 7, 9, 
11, 12 and 13 specify a particular type of bankruptcy case, provisions of which apply exclusively 
to those cases under it.6  The most common type of bankruptcy case is one under Chapter 7, 
providing for a liquidation or sale of the debtor’s assets and distribution of the net proceeds to 
creditors, as opposed to some form of rehabilitation of the debtor, as provided for by the 
remaining Chapters, i.e. Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13.7 
                                                 
1
 See 11 U.S.C.  101 et. seq. 
2
 Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, CERTIFIED INSOLVENCY AND RESTRUCTURING 
ADVISOR (CIRA) Study Course, 2 (Revised 2003) (unpublished CIRA study course). 
3
 Id. 
4
 Charles Jordan Tabb, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, 14 (Foundation Press 1997). 
5
 Id. at 14-15 
6
 Id. at 15 
7
 Id.  
 2
Chapter 13 is usually perceived to be the alternative to Chapter 7 for consumer debtors.8 
Chapter 12 is a Chapter 13 clone, which is available to family farmers.9  Chapter 11 is the basic 
reorganization Chapter.10  Chapter 9, seldom invoked, permits the adjustments of the debts of a 
municipality.11 
 
Bankruptcy Courts- 
Structure: 
Bankruptcy courts are federal courts with jurisdiction over cases arising under the 
Bankruptcy Code (Title 11 of the United States Code).12  Technically, bankruptcy courts receive 
cases that are referred to them by the Federal District Court; thus, Federal District Courts have 
power to retain jurisdiction over cases arising under Title 11.13   
Appeals of a bankruptcy court decision go through the trial district court first, and are then 
appealable through the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.14  
With the consent of all interested parties, appeals may also be brought to the Bankruptcy Appeals 
Panel, if a panel exists in the Circuit in which the appeal is made, which is generally composed 
of three sitting bankruptcy judges.15    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. 
11
 Id.  
12
 See 11 U.S.C. (1994). 
13
 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). 
14
 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1994). 
15
 Id. 
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II.  CORE PROCEEDINGS: 
For a bankruptcy judge to exercise its jurisdiction over a matter, the bankruptcy judge must 
determine that the issues to be resolved are core proceedings.16  Once an issue is determined to 
be a core proceeding, a bankruptcy court may issue decisions and apply non- bankruptcy law in 
the same manner as any other federal court.17  For example, if one of the claims in a Chapter 11 
case is for patent infringement, the bankruptcy court could effectively hold a trial on the issue of 
patent infringement within the ambit of a hearing to objections on claims.18  This allows the 
bankruptcy court to settle most matters related to the bankruptcy estate in one courtroom.  The 
following is a list of some of the matters considered core proceedings: 
1. [M]atters concerning the administration of the estate.19 
2. Allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemption from the property of 
the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the purpose of confirming a plan under 
Chapter 11, 12, or 13 of Title 11, but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or 
unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for the 
purposes of distribution in a case under Title 11.20 
3. Counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate.21 
4. Orders to turn over property of the estate.22 
5. Proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences.23 
6. Motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay.24 
7. Proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances.25 
8. Determinations as to dischargeability of particular debts.26 
9. Objections to discharges.27 
                                                 
16
 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1994). 
17
 See, Association of Insolvency Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 4. 
18
 Id. 
19
 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(1994). 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. 
24
 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1994). 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. 
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10. Confirmations of plans.28 
11. Orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash collateral.29 
12. Orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from claims brought 
by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate.30 
 
The bankruptcy judge determines whether a matter is a core proceeding.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. 
31
 See, Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 5. 
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III.  PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE:   (11 U.S.C §§ 541, 542) 
When a voluntary petition is filed or when an order for relief is entered in an involuntary 
proceeding, all property of the debtor vests in a bankruptcy estate.32  This includes all legal and 
equitable interests in property and in causes of action as well as any property recovered by the 
debtor-in-possession during the course of bankruptcy.33  The interests of the debtor and the 
debtor’s spouse in community property is also included in the estate if the debtor exercises any 
control over the property or the property was used to secure the debt that has matured into a 
claim against the debtor.34 
The Bankruptcy Code has a very comprehensive definition of property of the estate of a 
debtor.  Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code includes in the estate all legal and equitable 
interests of the debtor, wherever located and by whomever held.35 
Section 541(c)(1) states that property of the debtor will be included in the estate, notwithstanding 
any provision in an agreement or applicable non bankruptcy law that restricts or conditions such 
a transfer, including those that provide that property reverts to a creditor conditioned on the 
bankruptcy, financial condition or insolvency of the debtor.36 
There is one exception to this treatment in section 541(c)(2), which states that, “a restriction on 
the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable 
                                                 
32
 Questions of whether or not an item is included in the estate are almost always resolved in favor of inclusion: See 
In re Richard L. Kochell, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984) (IRA assets are property of the estate and can be used to 
satisfy debts of the estate); Under 11 U.S.C. § 542(a)(5) any property received by the debtor within 180 days of 
filing as an inheritance, death benefit, or a divorce settlement becomes property of the estate. 
33
 See Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 202. 
34
 11 U.S.C. § 542(a)(2) (1994). 
35
 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1994). 
36
 11 U.S.C. § 542(c)(1) (1994). 
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non bankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”37  The legislative history of the 
Bankruptcy Code indicates that this exception was intended to keep the assets of any spendthrift 
trust of which the debtor was a beneficiary out of the debtor’s estate in recognition of the wishes 
of the settler.38   
While section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to retain certain exempt 
assets, these assets go into the estate.  Under that section, a decision has to be made as to whether 
the property qualifies for one of the exemptions under section 522 or under the applicable state 
law.39   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 11 U.S.C. § 542(c)(2) (1994). 
38
 See Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 203. 
39
 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994). 
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IV.  ADEQUATE PROTECTION:   (11 U.S.C. § 361) 
General Concept- 
In instances where a creditor’s security interest in an asset is endangered, depreciating, or 
being dissipated by the debtor’s actions, the creditor may move the court for adequate 
protection.40  When a creditor seeks adequate protection, he is asking the court to ensure that the 
status quo will be maintained throughout the duration of the stay.41  The court has broad 
discretion in the method it chooses to remedy adequate protection problems. 
The legislative history indicates the process that the Congress intended to resolve 
adequate protection problems.  First, the trustee or the debtor-in-possession should propose a 
method for providing adequate protection.42  Then the creditor can accept, object or negotiate an 
alternative solution.43  If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the court will step in to resolve 
the dispute.44 
Though a creditor may enter an adequate protection motion with a desire to continue a 
foreclosure action or stop the debtor from granting an additional lien on property in which the 
creditor holds a security interest, the court may order an alternative remedy.45  The court may 
require the debtor-in-possession to make cash payments to the creditor in instances where the 
value of the collateral is decreasing or where the amount of any security cushion is eroding 
                                                 
40
 A motion for adequate protection can be brought under the Bankruptcy Code § 362 (relief form automatic stay), § 
363 (motion to halt the use of cash collateral), or § 364 (regarding the granting of liens on previously encumbered 
property). 
41
 There are three seminal cases in the adequate protection area: In re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 
426 (9th Cir. 1984), In re Briggs Transportation Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985) & United Savings of America v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Association, 484 U.S. 365(1988).  
42
 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1994). 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
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where interest accrues.46  The court may also choose to grant relief from the stay in order to 
allow the creditor to seize assets in which the creditor holds a security interest.47  The court must 
balance the danger to the interest of the creditor against the necessity of the property to the 
debtor in the reorganization.48 
Adequate protection may be required under three Bankruptcy Code sections: 
1. “Section 362 with the automatic stay—For example, unless the security interest of the 
debtor is adequately protected, the court may remove the stay.”49 
2. “Section 363 dealing with the use (including the use of cash collateral), sale or lease of 
property of the debtor—For example, the court may not approve the release of cash 
collateral until it has been determined that the impacted creditors are adequately 
protected.”50 
3. “Section 364 dealing with the obtaining of credit—For example, before the court might 
approve the granting of a senior or equal lien under the priming of a secured creditor, the 
court must ascertain that the creditor is adequately protected.”51  
Adequate protection, according to section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code, may be provided by: 
1. “Requiring the trustee or debtor-in-possession to make cash payments to the extent that 
the stay under section 362, or the use, sale, lease under section 363, or the grant of a lien 
under section 364 results in a decrease in the value of the entity’s interest in such 
property.”52 
                                                 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. 
49
 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). 
50
 See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994). 
51
 See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1994). 
52
 See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1994). 
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2. “Providing an additional or replacement lien to the extent that the stay, use, sale, or lease 
or grant results in a decrease in value of the entity’s interest in such property.”53 
3. “Granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to an administrative expense, 
that will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of the 
entity’s interest in such property.”54 
The meaning of “indubitable equivalent” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.  It often 
involves the substitute of one asset as collateral by another asset of lesser value in the case of 
debtor-in-possession financing.55  Note that the requirement is that the debtor must have the 
opportunity to realize the indubitable equivalent of the entity’s interest in the property and not 
the value of the property.56  Actually, this language has been held to refer to cases where more 
than one entity has an interest in the collateral.  The following analysis is still true- but it is 
independent of the quoted language.  Thus, if the creditor is adequately protected, then the debtor 
may be able to substitute less favorable collateral for the existing collateral.57  The bankruptcy 
court may look at the equity cushion or analyze special risk factors in determining if the debtor is 
adequately protected in these cases.58  
 
Equity Cushion- 
An equity cushion is the value in the property, above the amount owed to the creditor 
with a secured claim that will shield that creditor or claim from loss due to any decrease in the 
value of the property during the time the automatic stay remains in effect.59 
                                                 
53
 See 11 U.S.C.§ 361 (1994). 
54
 Id. 
55
 See Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 205. 
56
 Id.  
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
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Shortly after the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, a large number of courts began to 
evaluate the amount of the equity cushion that exists to determine if some form of adequate 
protection was necessary to prevent the relief from the automatic stay.60  The bankruptcy court in 
In re McKilips,61 analyzed prior cases and concluded that an equity cushion of less than 11 
percent is sufficient and a range between 12 and 20 percent has divided the courts.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60
 See Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 205. 
61
 In re McKilips, 81 B.R. 545 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987). 
62
 See, Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 205. 
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V.  THE AUTOMATIC STAY:   (11 U.S.C. § 362) 
 
General Concept- 
 
The automatic stay is an integral structural component of a U.S. bankruptcy case and is 
akin to a statutory injunction.63  It is self -executing, effective upon the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition.64  It is essential to the realization of two core functions of a bankruptcy case: (i) the 
equitable treatment of multiple creditor claims and (ii) a financial fresh start for honest debtors.65  
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, whether voluntary or involuntary, the automatic stay of 
section 362 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code comes into effect.  The stay applies to all entities and 
essentially provides for an injunction against litigation, lien enforcement or other actions taken 
against a debtor or the estate to either enforce or collect pre-petition claims.66  Creditors are 
precluded from getting a jump on their fellow creditors and the debtor is given a ‘breathing spell’ 
in order to enable him to reorganize.67  The stay, thus seeks to preserve the status quo as of the 
date the bankruptcy case is commenced until such time as the bankruptcy court can act.68  In 
addition, the stay prevents many other actions, formal or informal, which might affect property 
of the debtor of the estate. 
The broad scope of the automatic stay is illustrated in In re Sportfame of Ohio,Inc.,69  
Defendant Wilson Sporting group refused to ship its products to debtor, Sportfame, unless 
                                                 
63
 See Tabb, supra note 2, at 36. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id.at 39-40. 
68
 Id. 
69
 In re Sportfame of Ohio, Inc., 40 Bankr. 47 (N.D. Ohio1984). 
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Sportfame paid off pre-petition arrearages.70  While Wilson did not file any formal action against 
Sportfame, the conditioning of future shipments’ wages upon payment of arrearages was a 
violation of the automatic stay.71  Under the language of this case, any coercive action on the part 
of a creditor designed to pay a pre-petition debt can be a violation of the automatic stay.72  The 
remedy imposed by the court was to issue a mandatory injunction requiring Wilson to ship goods 
to Sportfame on a normal basis.73  
The following acts are expressly subject to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a): 
1. [T]he commencement, continuation of any judicial, administrative or other proceeding 
against the debtor which was or could have been commenced pre-petition, or any other 
proceeding to recover a claim against the debtor arising pre-petition.74  
2. The enforcement of a judgment against either the debtor or the property of the estate.75 
3. Any act to obtain property of the estate, and any act to exercise control over the estate.76 
4. Any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate.77 
5. Any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against the property of the estate to the 
extent that the lien secures a pre-petition claim.78 
6. Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose pre-petition.79 
7. The setoff of any debt owing to the debtor arising pre-petition against any claim against 
the debtor.80 
8. The commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court 
concerning the debtor.81 
                                                 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. at 56-57. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Jonathan L. Flaxer, How to Handle Consumer Bankruptcy Cases: A Practical Step-by-Step Guide, 52 PLI/NY, 
283 (1999); see In re Gucci, 126 F. 3d 380 (2d Cir. 1997); Koolik v. Markowitz, 40 F.3d 567 (2d Cir.1994) 
75
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 286; see Claughton v. Mixson, 33 f.3d 4,5 (4th superth Cir. 1994); In re Siskin, 231 
B.R. 514, 519 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
76
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 286; see In re Wicks, 176 B.R. 695 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d 215 B.R. 316 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).  
77
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 286; see In re Layton, 220 B.R. 508, 514 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Ferrante, 
195 B.R. 990 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996). 
78
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 286; see James v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank (In re Brooks), 871 F.2d 89, 90 (9th 
superth Cir.1989). 
79
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 287; see Sosne v. Reinert & Dureg, P.C. (In re Just Brakes System Inc.,) 108 F.3d 
881, 884 (8th superth Cir.1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 364, 139 L.Ed.2d 283 (1997). 
80
 See Flaxer, supra note 75, at 287; see AETNA Casualty & Surety Co. v. LTV Steel Co., Inc., (In re Chateaugay 
Corp.) 94 F 3d 772, 781 (2d Cir. 1996); Town of Hempstead Employees Fed. Credit Unoin v. Wicks, 215 B.R. 316 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Inosphere Clubs, Inc., 177 B.R. 198, 207 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
81
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 287; see In re CF & I Fabricators, Inc., 148 B.R. 332, 341 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992). 
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While the automatic stay of section 362(a) precludes many acts against the debtor or property 
of the estate, the following acts are excepted from the stay pursuant to section 362(b): 
1. [T]he commencement or continuation of a criminal action against the debtor.82 
2. The commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding to determine paternity or 
for the establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance or support, 
and attempts to collect alimony, maintenance or support from property that is not 
property of the estate.83  
3. Any act to perfect or to maintain or continue the perfection of an interest of an interest in 
property to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such perfection 
pursuant section 546(b), or to the extent that such perfection is accomplished within the 
statutory period provided in section 547(e)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.84 
4. The commencement or continuation of an action or proceedings by a governmental unit 
to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.85 
5. The enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained by a 
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s regulatory or police power.86 
6. Setoffs relating to certain securities and commodities transactions.87 
7. Setoffs relating to repurchase, or “repo’, agreements.88 
8. The commencement of any action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust that is or was insured by the National Housing 
Act and which covers property or combinations of property consisting of five or more 
living units.89 
9. An audit by a governmental unit to determine tax liability, the issuance of a notice of tax 
deficiency by a governmental unit; a demand for tax returns; or the making of an 
assessment for any tax and the issuance of a notice and demand for payment of such 
assessment.90 
                                                 
82
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 288; see In re Maloney, 204 B.R. 671 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Newman, 196 
B.R. 700, 764 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
83
  See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 288; see Terio v. Terio, 1994 W.L. 141980 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d 52 F. 3d 310 (2d 
Cir. 1995); In re Cole, 202 B.R. 356 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
84
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 288; see Klien v. Civale Trovato, Inc. (In re The Lionel Corp.), 29 F. 3d 88 (2d. 
Cir.1994) 
85
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 289; See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial, 
Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 112 S.Ct. 459, 116 L.8d 2d 358 (1991). 
86
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 289; See  State of New York v. Almy Bros., Inc., 1996 WL 12031 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); 
In re Ngan Gung Restaurant, Inc., 183 B.R. 689, 691 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
87
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 289; See Wolkowitz v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. (In re Weisberg), 136 F.3d 655, 
657 (9th superth Cir 1998). 
88
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 290; See Cohen v. Savings Bldg. & Loan Co. (In re Bevill, Bresler, & Schulman 
Asset Mgt. Corp.), 896 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1990). 
89
 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(8)(1994). 
90
 See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 290; see In re Carlson, 198 B.R. 949, 953 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 915 (7th 
superth Cir. 1997), cert. denied. Carlson v. United States, 523 U.S. 1060, 118 S.Ct. 1388 (1998); In re Neary, 220 
B.R. 864 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998). 
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10. Any act by a lessor to the debtor under a lease of on residential real property which has 
expired by its terms either pre-petition or during the bankruptcy case to obtain possession 
of such property.91 
11. The presentment of a negotiable instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting 
dishonor of such an instrument.92 
      12. &13.  In a case involving a debtor subject to reorganization under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, after ninety days after the petition date, the commencement or 
continuation, and conclusion to the final judgment, of an action to foreclose a ship or 
fleet mortgage or a mortgage or other interest in a fishing facility held by the Secretary of 
Transportation or Secretary of Commerce.93 
14.  Any action by an accrediting agency regarding the accreditation status of the debtor as 
an educational facility.94 
15.  Any action by a State licensing body regarding the licensure of the debtor as an 
educational institution.95 
16. Any action by a guaranty agency regarding the eligibility of the debtor to participate in 
programs under the Higher Education Act of 1965.96 
17. The setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim in connection with certain 
swap agreements.97 
18. The creation or perfection of a statutory lien for an ad valorem property tax.98 
 
The automatic stay of any act against property generally remains in effect unless such 
property is no longer property of the estate.99  The stay of any other act listed in the Bankruptcy 
Code § 362(a) remains in effect until the earlier of the time the case is closed, the time the case is 
dismissed or, the time the debtor receives a discharge.100 
The court may terminate, annul, modify or condition the automatic stay upon the request of a 
party in interest if there is a cause, such as a lack of adequate protection of that party’s interest in 
property, or, with respect to stay of an act against property under the Bankruptcy Code § 362(a), 
if the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary to an effective 
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reorganization.101  If the court should rule upon a party’s request for relief from an automatic 
stay of an act against property of the estate within thirty days after the request, the stay is 
automatically terminated as to the party making the request, unless the court, after notice and a 
hearing, orders otherwise.102  
The party requesting relief from the stay bears the burden of proof on the issue of the 
debtor’s equity in the property.103  The debtor bears the burden of proof on all other issues.104  If 
any individual is injured by any willful violation of the automatic stay, that individual may 
recover actual damages including costs, attorneys’ fees, and in some cases, punitive damages as 
well.105 
Section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for relief from the stay.  Section 362(h) 
states: “Any individual injured by the willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall 
recover actual damages, including costs, and attorneys’ fees, and in, appropriate circumstances, 
may recover punitive damages.”106 
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VI.  AUTOMATIC STAY ISSUES:    
Introduction- 
The automatic stay is fundamental to the bankruptcy process, and only the bankruptcy 
court in which the case is pending has jurisdiction to grant or deny relief from the stay.107  The 
point of contention is whether a state court or more generally, a non bankruptcy tribunal has 
jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies in the first instance, and what effect should be 
given to a judgment rendered when the non bankruptcy forum decides, perhaps erroneously, that 
the stay does not apply.108  The question comes down to whether state courts have jurisdiction to 
determine their own jurisdiction when the stay is at issue.  Federal courts have been divided on 
this question.109  The consensus, however, now seems to favor the traditional view that, while  
bankruptcy courts alone have jurisdiction to lift or modify the stay, state courts like non 
bankruptcy federal courts, have jurisdiction to determine whether the stay does or does not cut 
off the tribunal’s jurisdiction to reach the merits of the case.110  Federal courts should be bound 
by a state court ruling in this respect.111  
A second and related topic is whether a state court, or more generally, any forum, other 
than the bankruptcy court where a case is pending, has jurisdiction to impose sanctions for an 
alleged violation of the stay.  Although this question has not arisen frequently, the weight of 
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authority now holds that, even if a state court or another federal court has jurisdiction to 
determine whether the stay applies, only the bankruptcy court where the case is pending has 
jurisdiction to call a party to task for violating the stay.112  This follows from the more general 
principle that only a court seized of a case may impose sanctions for interference with that 
court’s orders or process.113 
A third type of stay dispute has arisen particularly in the context of consumer 
bankruptcies.114  If a creditor has lawfully repossessed a debtor’s property before filing of the 
bankruptcy petition (pre-petition), but if the property has not been sold or title has not been 
passed, so that the debtor still retains rights in the property, courts have disagreed strongly as to 
whether the creditor violates the stay, by simply retaining the property until adequate protection 
is provided.115  Some courts have held that the creditor has an absolute duty to turn over the 
property regardless of adequate protection, and hence that the creditor violates the stay if this is 
not done.116  Others have held that merely retaining the property does not violate the stay and 
that the creditor has no duty to surrender the property until adequate protection is given.117     
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(a)  Do State Courts Have Jurisdiction To Determine Their Own Jurisdiction When The  
 
Automatic Stay Is At Issue? 
 
Overview of the problem: 
 
A bankruptcy court where a case is pending has exclusive original jurisdiction to grant or 
deny relief from the stay.118  No other court may do so as an original matter.119  Although 
bankruptcy courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to grant relief from the stay, it is 
universally conceded that other federal courts may decide whether the stay applies to them in a 
case before them.120  If a lower federal court erroneously decides that the stay does not apply and 
proceeds to render a judgment that judgment is not subject to collateral attack.121  The only 
remedy is by way of direct appeal.122  If the reviewing federal court decides that the stay did 
apply, the proper step for the higher court to take is not to reverse the judgment, or even to reach 
to the merits of the case.123  The reviewing court, should, rather vacate the judgment on the 
ground that the stay deprived the lower court of jurisdiction to render any judgment at all.124 
The area of dispute has been whether the same principles apply to state courts.  The 
majority rule has been that state courts like non bankruptcy federal courts, have jurisdiction to 
decide whether a stay applies in a pending action.125  If a lower state court erroneously holds that 
the stay does not apply and proceeds to render a judgment, the proper course is not to attack the 
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judgment collaterally.126  Rather, relief should be sought in a higher state court, and ultimately, if 
necessary, in the United States Supreme Court.127 
A few cases have, however, held that the state courts do not even have jurisdiction to 
determine whether the stay applies.128  Thus, a state appellate court would lack jurisdiction to 
correct the errors of a lower court in this respect because state reviewing courts, like state trial 
courts, lack jurisdiction to decide the applicability of the stay.129  Therefore, state court 
judgments allegedly rendered in violation of the stay are subject to collateral review in the 
bankruptcy court.130  If the bankruptcy court decides that the stay was violated, it may disregard, 
or even vacate, the state court’s judgment.131  The bankruptcy court’s decision that the stay did or 
did not apply to the state court action would then be subject to direct review in the federal 
judicial system.132   
 
Cases holding that the state courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies: 
1.  Raymark Indus., Inc. v Lai133 
Raymark Indus., Inc. v Lai134 was one of the early cases to imply that state courts do not 
have jurisdiction to decide whether the stay applies.135  There, a products liability plaintiff had 
obtained a judgment against Raymark Industries in a California court.136  Raymark had paid a 
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deposit into court to stay the execution of the judgment.137  Subsequently, an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition was filed against Raymark in the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.138  
Although Raymark had been preparing an appeal in the tort case, Raymark contended that the 
entire proceeding was subject to the automatic stay.139  Relying on bankruptcy precedents to the 
effect that an action against a pre-petition deposit into court did not violate the stay, the 
bankruptcy court held that the stay did not apply, and the district court affirmed.140 
Furthermore, Raymark had not transmitted the complete record to the California Court of 
Appeals, maintaining that the stay barred any further action in the lawsuit.141  The state appellate 
court dismissed Raymark’s appeal for want of diligent prosecution.142  In the appeal from the 
decision of the lower federal courts, the Third Circuit reversed the district court and the 
bankruptcy court and held that the state court proceeding was stayed by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a).143  The Third Circuit held that reliance on bankruptcy precedents was misplaced.144  This 
reversal of the lower federal court’s decision presented no remarkable jurisdictional issues.   
In the present case, the Third Circuit Court chose to address the decision of the California 
Court of Appeals dismissing Raymark’s appeal.145  The Third Circuit conceded that with 
exceptions not relevant to the case at bar, lower federal courts have no jurisdiction to collaterally 
review the merits of a state court decision.146  The Third Circuit, however, maintained that a 
federal court may collaterally review a state court’s express or implied determination of its own 
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jurisdiction.147  The Third Circuit held that state actions taken in violation of the stay are void ab 
initio.148  The state appellate court’s decision to dismiss the debtor’s appeal was based on a 
mistaken conclusion that the stay did not apply.149  The Third Circuit, thus concluded that the 
decision of the California Court of Appeals was void.150  The federal court remanded the case 
with directions to the bankruptcy court to vacate the judgment of the state appellate court and 
thus to reinstate the state court appeal.151 
The Raymark Indus.152 decision was noteworthy in its holding that a federal bankruptcy 
court had the authority to render an order vacating the decision of a state court of appeals.153  The 
decision, however, offered no real explanation as to why a federal court may not collaterally 
review the merits of a state court decision but why nonetheless it may review a state court’s 
decision as to its own jurisdiction.154  The only explanation that would make the Raymark 
Indus155 holding coherent is that the state court has no jurisdiction to determine whether the stay 
applies.156  Thus, when a state court’s judgment allegedly violates the stay, a bankruptcy court 
should conduct a de novo review of that question.157  If the bankruptcy court determines 
independently that the stay does not apply, then it must give full faith and credit to the state court 
judgment on the merits.158  If, however the stay did apply, then the bankruptcy court should 
vacate the judgment without reference to the merits.159 
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For several years Raymark Indus.160 was something of an anomaly, and it aroused 
relatively little attention.161  It was a series of decisions from the Ninth Circuit that thrust to the 
fore the question of state court jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the stay.162  
2.  The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in In re Gruntz163 
In re Gruntz164 involved the criminal prosecution and conviction of the debtor, Robert 
Gruntz for failure to pay child support.165  The District Attorney of the Los Angeles County had 
sought and obtained a conviction under section 270 of the California Penal Code.166  Both in the 
state trial court and on appeal, Gruntz had argued that the courts of California had no jurisdiction 
because the action violated the automatic stay 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (prohibiting the 
commencement or continued prosecution of any action against the debtor that was begun or 
could have begun before the commencement of the case).167  The state court of appeals held that 
the case fell squarely within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1), which exempts from the stay the 
commencement or continuation of any criminal action or proceeding against the debtor.168  After 
his state court convictions were final, Gruntz filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy 
court seeking to nullify the criminal convictions on the ground that the state court courts lacked 
jurisdiction to decide that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) applied, particularly in light of Hucke  v. State of 
Oregon.169   The bankruptcy court dismissed Gruntz’s complaint on res judicata grounds, noting 
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that the applicability of the stay had been presented to and been rejected by the California court 
and was the same affirmed by the district court.170   
In two sharply divided panel opinions, the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the 
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to decide whether the stay applied and to collaterally review 
the state court convictions.171  The majority in both panel opinions held that the state court 
determination that the stay applied was in no way binding on federal courts, and that the 
bankruptcy court could disregard the fact that the state court had erred and the stay did not 
apply.172  The majority held that neither the Rooker-Feldman doctrine173 nor preclusion applies 
when rendering forum has acted in the absence of all jurisdiction; and, according to panel 
majorities, only the bankruptcy court has initial jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies 
at all.174   
In sharp dissents in both panels, Judge Fletcher maintained that the California courts had 
already decided that the stay did not apply and hence that they had jurisdiction over the criminal 
prosecution.175   
                                                                                                                                                             
The debtor then turned to the bankruptcy court to seek release.  The debtor maintained that the revocation of his 
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On February 3, 2000, the Ninth Circuit handed down its final decision in Gruntz in a 
unanimous ruling.176  The Ninth Circuit reiterated the earlier holdings of the panel majorities that 
federal courts are not bound in any fashion by a state court ruling when the state court has acted 
in absence of all jurisdiction.177  In such a case, the state court judgment is a nullity and the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.178  The Gruntz179 court, however, framed the issue not 
as to whether a state court has jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies, but rather as 
whether a state court has jurisdiction to grant relief from the stay.180  The court pointed out that 
granting relief from the stay is a core matter and the court then came to the unremarkable 
conclusion that only the bankruptcy court in which the bankruptcy case is pending has 
jurisdiction as an initial matter to vacate, annul, modify or lift the stay.181  The court went on to 
state that a federal court should examine the motives for a state court prosecution only in the 
rarest and most egregious circumstances.182   
The Ninth Circuit in In re Durbar,183 held squarely that no state tribunal, whether judicial 
or administrative, has jurisdiction to decide whether the stay applies.184  Original jurisdiction 
over that question is vested exclusively in the non-bankruptcy court where the case is pending.185  
According to Dunbar,186 then if a state forum takes some action that allegedly violates the stay, 
that decision is always open to collateral review in the bankruptcy court, even if the state court 
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has declared that the stay does not apply.187  The bankruptcy court’s examination must be de 
novo.188  If the bankruptcy court determines independently that the stay does not apply, then it 
must give full faith and credit to the state tribunal’s decision on the merits.189  If however, the 
bankruptcy court determines independently that the stay did apply, then the bankruptcy court 
should enjoin the enforcement of the state forum’s orders, vacate the state decision, or otherwise 
refuse to extend full faith and credit.190 
3.  In re Rainwater191   
In Rainwater, an Alabama state court had revoked the debtor wife’s probation post- 
petition, following her pre-petition conviction for theft.192  The bankruptcy court issued a writ of 
habeas corpus, awarded declaratory and injunctive relief, and refused to award damages.193  The 
most important aspect of the Rainwater194 decision was that the court held that the stay barred 
the revocation proceeding and that a federal court could collaterally review the state court’s 
decision.195  The bankruptcy court held that a criminal prosecution or a probation proceeding is 
not exempted from the stay if the purpose of the action is to enforce or collect a claim or a debt, 
and that restitution falls into that category.196  The court held that the state court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the underlying action because of the stay; that a state court judgment 
rendered under such circumstances was not entitled to full faith and credit; and that the Rooker- 
Feldman doctrine did not apply because of the lack of jurisdiction.197 
                                                 
187
 See Young, supra note 108, at 33. 
188
 Id. at 34. 
189
 See In re Motley, 268 B.R. 237 (Bankr. C.D. Cal 2001) (discussing Dunbar and Gruntz) 
190
 Id. 
191
 In re Rainwater, 233 B.R. 126 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999). 
192
 Id. 
193
 Id. at 127. 
194
 Rainwater, 233 B.R. 126. 
195
 See Young, supra note 108, at 35. 
196
 See Rainwater, 233 B.R. 129. 
197
 Id. at 130. 
 26
The district court vacated the bankruptcy court’s judgment on appeal.198  The court did 
not reach the question of full faith and credit, or, of the applicability of the Rooker Feldman 
doctrine.199  Rather, the district court emphasized the strong policy against federal interference 
with state court criminal proceedings and rejected the idea that there is a debt collection 
exception to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(1).200 
 
Cases holding that state courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies and that 
federal courts are barred from collateral review of such jurisdictional decisions: 
1.  In re Singleton201 
In In re Singleton202, the Ohio state court had decided that neither 11 U.S.C. § 362 nor the 
co-debtor stay, (11 U.S.C. §1301), protected the property of a corporation owned by the Chapter 
13 debtor, and the state court had ordered the sale of the debtor’s property.203  The debtor did not 
seek review before an Ohio state Appellate court, but rather commenced an adversary proceeding 
in a bankruptcy court in an effort to nullify the state court judgment and the sale.204  The 
bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the bankruptcy 
appellate panel affirmed.205 
The Singleton206 court never discussed whether the state court had correctly interpreted 
the Bankruptcy Code; rather the panel held that a lower federal tribunal lacked subject matter 
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jurisdiction to address that question at all.207  The state court had jurisdiction to decide whether 
the stay applied, even though the state court lacked jurisdiction to lift or modify the stay.208  For 
a federal court to revisit the question whether the stay applied would amount to usurping the 
functions of a state appellate court.209  The debtor’s proper remedy would have been to appeal to 
a higher court in Ohio, and ultimately to seek review before the United States Supreme Court, if 
necessary.210  The debtor had failed to follow that course, and a lower federal court could only 
dismiss the action.211 
2.  In re Siskin212 
In In re Siskin,213 creditors had obtained pre-petition judgments against the debtor in the 
courts of New York.214  The debtor had refused to cooperate with examinations in aid of 
execution, or otherwise, obey court orders.215  After the bankruptcy petition was filed, the 
judgment creditors sought and obtained a contempt order and an order of commitment from a 
state court.216  The debtor contended that the proceedings violated the stay, 11 U.S.C. §§ 
362(a)(1), (2), (6), but the state court rejected the argument.217  The debtor was incarcerated 
briefly and sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States district court for the Eastern 
District of New York.218  The habeas corpus action was rendered moot when the debtor was 
released from confinement.219 
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The debtor then commenced adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court seeking 
sanctions against the creditors and their attorneys for a willful violation of the stay.220  Initially, 
the bankruptcy court had agreed that the stay had been violated.221  The defendants, however, 
maintained that the state court had already made a decision that the stay did not apply to the 
contempt proceeding, and that the bankruptcy court was precluded from revisiting that 
question.222  The bankruptcy court agreed and dismissed the adversary proceeding.223  The debtor 
moved for reconsideration, asking the court to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Gruntz.224 
In the opinion on reconsideration, the bankruptcy court rejected Gruntz,225 and adhered to 
its earlier decision to dismiss the action seeking sanctions.226  The Siskin227 court reasoned that 
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), does not give bankruptcy courts the authority to determine whether the stay 
applies, and there is no principled reason to say that state courts do not have the same 
authority.228  If the state court makes an erroneous decision as to the applicability of the stay- i.e., 
as to its own jurisdiction, the proper remedy is to seek relief in a higher state tribunal, not to ask 
a federal bankruptcy court to slip into the robes of  a state appellate court.229  The state court had 
made an explicit or implicit decision that the stay did not apply.230  The Siskin231 court held that 
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under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court lacked jurisdiction to collaterally review that 
determination.232   
The Siskin233 court noted that the contempt power lies at the very heart of the authority of 
a state judicial system to vindicate the dignity and integrity of its own courts.234  If any tribunal 
should interfere with or overturn a contempt order, it should be a higher court with the same 
judicial system, not a federal bankruptcy court.235  
3.  In re Glass236  
In In re Glass237 the court gave an analysis very much like the bankruptcy appellate 
panel’s analysis in Singleton238 and rejected the reasoning of both, the majority in Gruntz I239 and 
the Rainwater.240  In this case, the debtor brought an adversary proceeding seeking damages 
from his former wife and her attorneys for an alleged stay violation.241  The former wife had 
pursued a post-petition action in a Georgia court to hold the debtor in contempt for failure to pay 
support pursuant to a divorce decree.242  The debtor had raised the stay issue, but the state court 
had held that the action fell within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii), which exempts 
from the stay, the commencement or continuation of any action for the establishment or 
modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support.243  The Glass244 court refused to 
revisit the Georgia court’s decision concerning the stay.245  Instead, like the Singleton246 panel, 
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the Glass247 court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether the court had 
adjudicated the issue correctly.248  The debtor was asking the bankruptcy court to sit as a state 
appellate court, and this was impermissible.249  Alternatively, the debtor was attempting to attack 
the state court decision collaterally, which was likewise impermissible.250   
 
Analysis supporting the view that state courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the stay 
applies: 
The analysis as to why state courts should have jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies 
to matters brought before it should begin by understanding the jurisdictional statute- 28 U.S.C. § 
1334, and its effects. 
1.   28 U.S.C. § 1334 and its effects 
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1334, states:  
(a) [E]xcept as provided in sub-section (b) of this section, the district courts shall have original 
and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11. 
(b) “ Notwithstanding any act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts 
other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction 
of all civil proceedings arising under Title 11, or arising in or related to cases under Title 11.”251 
 
The Ninth Circuit in Gruntz252 and in Dunbar253 interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1334, by stating 
that the same was a jurisdiction- divesting statute.254  The Rainwater255 court had reached the 
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same conclusion as well.256  However, this statutory interpretation is mistaken.257  28 U.S.C. § 
1334(a) vests district courts- and, by referral under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a),258 bankruptcy courts, 
with original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases.259  It is undoubted that this statute 
deprives state courts of jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, but that is beside the point.260   
The courts in Siskin261 and Glass,262 pointed out that 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) is not relevant 
in determining whether state courts have jurisdiction to decide whether the automatic stay 
applies.263  A proceeding to determine whether the stay applies to a given action is not “a case 
under Title 11”, over which bankruptcy courts have ‘original and exclusive’ jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1334(a).264  Moreover, the underlying state courts actions in all the cases discussed 
above were not “cases under Title 11.”265  Both, the Siskin266 and the Glass267 court noted that 
the pertinent jurisdictional statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), which vests bankruptcy courts with 
original, but not exclusive jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or 
arising in, or related to cases under Title 11.”268  The Siskin269 and the Glass270 courts, therefore, 
properly held that a proceeding to determine whether the stay applies at all is a proceeding 
arising in or under the Bankruptcy Code or that is related to a bankruptcy case.271   
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Another case which deserves mention and discussion here, is Andria D. Powell v. 
Washington Land Co., INC.272  In this case, an appeal was brought to the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals from the decision of the Superior Court of Washington.273  Here, the Appellant 
was a tenant under a lease managed by the landlord, the Washington land company.274  The 
Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia had entered a 
default judgment against the Appellant and her husband, granting the landlord possession of the 
property and the landlord then filed a writ of execution on the judgment against the Appellant.275  
Eight days later, the appellant filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code in the U.S. bankruptcy Court of the District of Columbia.276  Three days later, the agents of 
the landlord attempted to evict the Appellant, pursuant to the Writ of Execution.277  The 
Appellant then filed a complaint in the D.C. Superior Court alleging wrongful eviction, violation 
of automatic stay resulting form the bankruptcy filing, and conversion.278  The trial court 
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the appellant/debtor 
appealed.279   
The bankruptcy jurisdiction granted to the district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and (b) 
may be transferred to the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157.280  Section 157(b) allows the 
bankruptcy court to hear and decide cases as to which the district court has exclusive jurisdiction 
under § 1334(a) (cases under “Title 11”) as well as “core proceedings” as to which the district 
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court has original, but not exclusive jurisdiction under § 1334(b) (proceedings “arising under 
Title 11” or arising in a case under Title 11.”)281  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
determined that in the context of the Bankruptcy Code’s jurisdictional statutory scheme, the 
narrow issue was whether the complaint filed by the Appellant in the Superior Court was a “case 
under Title 11” over which the U.S. District Court (or bankruptcy court) had exclusive 
jurisdiction.282  If it was so, the Superior court would have no jurisdiction to hear the claim and 
the court would have properly dismissed the Appellant’s compliant.283  If not, the Superior Court 
would have jurisdiction because even if the claim could have been brought in U.S. District Court, 
as a proceeding “arising under Title 11” over which the U.S. District Court (or bankruptcy court) 
had original but not exclusive jurisdiction, the statute did not require that the claim be brought in 
a federal court.284   
The court, in holding that that the appellant’s claim for wrongful eviction, for violation of 
the stay, and for conversion were within the Superior Court’s jurisdiction285, partly relied on the 
explanation of the jurisdictional provisions, provided by the court in In re Brady, Texas, Mun. 
Gas Corp 286 which stated : “Although the district courts ‘have original and exclusive jurisdiction 
of all cases under Title 11,’ the district courts do not have ‘exclusive jurisdiction of all civil 
proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to cases under Title 11.’  Thus, under § 
1334, the only aspect of the bankruptcy proceeding over which the district courts and their 
bankruptcy units have exclusive jurisdiction is the bankruptcy petition itself.”287   
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“In other matters arising in or relating to Title 11 cases, unless the Code provides otherwise, state 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction….”288 
The Dunbar 289 decision and all the three Gruntz 290opinions reasoned that the stay is 
fundamental to a bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction over a bankruptcy case, and hence 
that, by extension, bankruptcy jurisdiction over all stay issues should be exclusive.291  As Judge 
Fletcher pointed out in his dissents in Gruntz I292 and Gruntz II293, however, courts may not use 
policy considerations to rewrite statutes, and as a general rule, policy concerns alone cannot cut 
off state court jurisdiction unless Congress has chosen to enact that policy.294 
Nothing in 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and certainly nothing in 11 U.S.C. § 362, purports to deprive a 
state court of jurisdiction to determine whether the automatic stay applies.295  A judgment 
rendered in violation of the stay might be a nullity if a state court simply ignored the stay or was 
not aware of it, but that does not mean that a determination by a non- bankruptcy tribunal that the 
stay does not apply in the first instance would be a nullity.296   
2.  Rooker- Feldman Doctrine 
The Rooker- Feldman doctrine is based on two Supreme Court rulings separated by 60 
years, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman297 and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.298  
The gist of the doctrine is that lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review a state court 
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judgment; such jurisdiction belongs only to the Supreme Court.299  In particular, lower federal 
courts may not review a state court decision for errors in construing or applying federal law if the 
state court actually decided the federal issue or if the alleged errors are “inextricably intertwined” 
with the state court judgment.300  A claim in the federal court is inextricably intertwined with a 
state court judgment if the relief requested in the federal forum would effectively nullify the state 
court ruling, or if the claim in the federal court could succeed only to the extent that the federal 
tribunal determined that the state court had erroneously decided the issues before it.301   
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is related to principles of full faith and credit, 28 U.S.C. § 
1738, and to res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).302  
Whereas the claim and issue preclusive effects of state court judgments are affirmative defenses 
that may be waived and that have nothing to do with a federal court’s jurisdiction, Rooker- 
Feldman is a jurisdictional doctrine that declares that a lower federal court may not usurp the 
functions of a state appellate court or of the Supreme Court.303  Even if the federal court would 
otherwise have jurisdiction to consider the issue as an original matter, the federal court is 
divested of jurisdiction if a state court has already decided.304  Thus, as it is jurisdictional, the 
Rooker- Feldman doctrine should be applied even before reaching the question of res juidcata or 
collateral estoppel.305  
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The Siskin,306  Singleton,307 as well as the dissent in two panel decisions in Gruntz308 
relied primarily on the Rooker- Feldman doctrine to conclude that a federal court may not disturb 
a state court determination that the automatic stay does not apply.309  The Rainwater310 court, 
however, denied that the Rooker- Feldman doctrine could shield a state court decision 
concerning the stay from nullification.311   
The question raised in Dunbar,312 Gruntz,313 Singleton,314 Siskin,315 Glass,316 and 
Rainwater317 was precisely whether a state court determination that the stay did not apply cut off 
a lower federal court’s authority to revisit that question, or to sit, in essence, as a reviewing 
court.318  The Singleton,319 Siskin,320 and Glass321 courts gave thorough discussions of exceptions 
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and properly concluded that none of those exceptions applied.322  
First, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply when the statute vests exclusive jurisdiction 
in federal courts or a particular class of federal courts and when a state court simply ignores or 
defies the statute.323  For example, a state court judgment purporting to to lift, modify, or annul 
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the stay would be void ab initio.324  The void ab initio exception to Rooker-Feldman is very 
narrowly construed, however.325   
Second, the doctrine does not apply if a federal statute specifically grants lower federal 
courts the right to review state court judgments.326  For example, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 
authorize federal district courts to review state court decisions on habeas corpus proceedings.327  
The Rooker- Feldman would be irrelevant in such an instance.328  Further, there is no comparable 
bankruptcy statute.329   
Third, the doctrine does not prevent the review of a state court judgment that was 
procured by fraud, deception, accident or mistake.330  For example, if the debtor or another party 
had actively concealed the existence of a bankruptcy case, from a state court, and if the state 
court had then rendered the judgment against the debtor post-petition, a bankruptcy court could 
disregard the judgment.331  No such fraud, deception or mistake appears to have been involved in 
any of the cases discussed above.   
Fourth, the doctrine has been held inapplicable when the party seeking relief in a federal 
court does not have any reasonable opportunity to present his or her federal claim or defense in 
state court.332  In such a case, the federal issue could not be considered inextricably intertwined 
with the state court judgment.333   
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Lastly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will not bar a federal action by someone who was 
not a party to a state court action or in privity with the party, and who, thus could not have raised 
the federal issue or sought state court appellate review.334  In the cases at issue here, theses 
exceptions did not come into play.  The debtors were parties to the state court action and were 
able to raise the automatic stay issue before the state tribunals.  
Since no exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied, the bankruptcy appellate 
panel in Singleton,335 and the bankruptcy courts in Siskin336 and Glass337 correctly decided that 
lower federal courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain the attacks of the debtors on the respective 
state court judgments.338  Only state appellate courts, or, ultimately the Supreme Court could 
review whether the state trial courts had interpreted 11 U.S.C. § 362 correctly.339  The 
bankruptcy court’s opinion in Dunbar,340 Gruntz,341 and Raymark342 were simply erroneous and 
would mistakenly allow lower federal courts to sit as appellate tribunals to review state court 
decisions.343 
3.  Full Faith and Credit and Preclusion  
The Full Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires a federal court to give a state 
court’s judgment the same preclusive effects that they would be given by courts in the rendering 
state.344 The courts have repeatedly held that when a state court has determined that the 
automatic stay does not apply to an action pending in that forum, then the issue of the state 
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court’s jurisdiction over the underlying action and the applicability of the stay may not be 
relitigated in a federal tribunal.345  Reconsideration of the question of the applicability of the stay 
is barred by collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).346  A state court has jurisdiction to determine 
its own jurisdiction, and the reconsideration of jurisdictional issues such as the stay is subject to 
preclusion just like other issues.347  The merits of the judgment in the underlying state court case, 
in turn, may not be relitigated under principles of res judicata (claim preclusion).348     
The panel majorities in the first two Gruntz349 rightly acknowledged that the relitigation 
of jurisdictional issues may be barred, and that the jurisdiction of the first court may be shielded 
from collateral attack, even if the original court made an arguably erroneous determination that it 
had subject matter jurisdiction.350  The Gruntz 351panel majorities, however, maintained that this 
principle applied only when the original forum had undertaken an express examination of 
grounds for its jurisdiction.352   Although the state courts in Gruntz353 had decided that the 
automatic stay did not apply, they had apparently not made an explicit determination that they 
had jurisdiction to make such a decision or to construe 11 U.S.C. § 362.354  Therefore, according 
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to the panel majorities in Gruntz I355 and Gruntz II356, the reconsideration of the state court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction was not precluded.357  The Dunbar 358court had held that for relevant 
purposes, the distinction between the Rooker- Feldman and preclusive doctrines was 
immaterial.359  If a state tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide whether the stay applied, its 
decision concerning the stay would be entitled to no deference under any theory.360  
There is no general requirement that a state court must expressly examine its jurisdiction 
to determine its own jurisdiction.361  Moreover, a party that has had a reasonable opportunity to 
raise the question of jurisdictional defects before the rendering forum and relied to do so may not 
thereafter raise subject matter jurisdiction in a collateral attack, even if the rendering forum did 
not explicitly address the jurisdictional issues.362  Thus, a party who claims that 11 U.S.C. § 362 
bars an action in a bankruptcy forum must raise all arguments connected with that contention in 
the rendering court or on direct appeal, not in a collateral attack.363   This reasoning may not 
apply if a state court had rendered judgment while simply ignoring or defying a federal statute 
ousting it of jurisdiction.364  That was not the case in Dunbar365 or any of the other relevant 
cases. 
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4.  The weight of case-law 
Before Gruntz366 scarcely any court of appeals had held that state courts lack jurisdiction 
to determine whether the stay applies, or that 28. U.S.C. § 1334(a) gives bankruptcy courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over that question.367  The only possible exception was Raymark,368 and 
that court did not cite any statutory basis for its holding.369  Prior to 1999, the court of appeals 
that had addressed the issue had held that non-bankruptcy tribunals had concurrent jurisdiction to 
determine whether the stay applied, and hence to decide whether they had subject matter 
jurisdiction to proceed with the cases pending before them.370  The Third Circuit and the Second 
Circuit courts had also accepted this view.371  The lower courts in the Ninth Circuit had agreed 
prior to Gruntz372 and Dunbar373 that non-bankruptcy courts have concurrent jurisdiction to 
determine the applicability of the stay.374 
  The overwhelming majority of lower courts that have considered the issue have held that 
state courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the automatic stay applies.375  Lower courts in 
the Second Circuit, which are bound by In re Baldwin- United Corp. Litg.,376 have taken this 
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position.377  In re Bona,378 and in Siskin379, the courts expressly rejected the notion that the 
Baldwin380 holding was limited to federal courts.381  In the Sixth Circuit, where N.L.R.B. v. 
Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 382state courts are deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction.383  In 
the Eleventh Circuit, the Rainwater384 court’s position that state courts may not determine the 
applicability of the stay is contrary to the holdings of other lower courts in that jurisdiction.385  
Other bankruptcy courts in the Eleventh Circuit have consistently maintained that they are bound 
by state court determinations as to whether the stay applied to state court proceedings.386  Lower 
courts in other circuits have also held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the applicability of the stay, and that federal courts may not attack such determination 
collaterally.387 
 
(b) Do State Courts (Or Other Non-Bankruptcy Tribunals) Have Jurisdiction To Impose 
Sanctions For An Alleged Violation Of The Automatic Stay? 
  A second and related topic is whether a state court, or, more generally, any forum other 
than where the bankruptcy case is pending, has jurisdiction to impose sanctions for an alleged 
violation of the stay.   
 
 
                                                 
377
 Young, supra note 108, at 47. 
378
 See Bona, 124 B.R. 11. 
379
 Siskin, 258 B.R. 554. 
380
 Baldwin, 765 F.2d 343. 
381
 Young, supra note 108, at 49. 
382
 Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934. 
383
 Young, supra note 108, at 49. 
384
 Rainwater, 233 B.R. 126. 
385
 Young, supra note 108 at 49. 
386
 Id.; see also Mann, 88 B.R. 427 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999); Cummings, 201 B.R. 586 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996). 
387
 Young, supra note 108, at 49; See Martinez, 227 B.R. 442 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1998); Weller, 189 B.R. 467 (Bankr. 
E.D. Wis. 1995). 
 43
Following are few cases that address this issue: 
 1.  Daniel Hawthorne v. Akhtar Hammed388 
In this case, a collection agency, Oklahoma Collection Bureau (“OCB”), obtained a 
default judgment against Hawthorne in an Oklahoma state court, based on his failure to pay 
medical bills to Akhtar Hammeed.389  OCB then began garnishing the wages of Hawthorne.390  
Hawthorne filed for bankruptcy some six months later, triggering an automatic stay.391  
Nonetheless, OCB, allegedly lacking notice of Hawthorne’s bankruptcy, began garnishing its 
wages, and Hawthorne lost his job as a result.392  Hawthorne then sued OCB and Hameed in a 
state court under Oklahoma law for causing his job loss and emotional distress.393  A jury 
ultimately awarded the Hawthorne, $ 175,000 in compensatory damages.394  On appeal, OCB 
challenged the state court’s jurisdiction over Hawthorne’s action because they claimed that it 
was based solely upon an alleged violation of the bankruptcy stay.395   
The court first reasoned that “the bankruptcy court has the responsibility to determine the 
effects of its own stay and to enforce its own orders…….Any proceedings involving the 
bankrupt debtor are outside a state court’s jurisdiction.”396  The court, however, acknowledged 
that it had not found any case involving a similar factual scenario.397  The court found that OCB 
had a lawful right to garnish Hawthorne’s wages until he filed for bankruptcy.398  The court 
explained that OCB’s acts “became ‘wrongful’ or ‘negligent’ only under federal law upon the 
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imposition of the automatic stay.”399  Thus, the court reasoned that OCB’s alleged wrongful 
garnishment was not actionable under state law because Hawthorne was not entitled to relief in 
state court for acts arising solely from a violation of the automatic stay ordered by the federal 
bankruptcy court.”400  Accordingly, the court held that state court lacked jurisdiction over 
Hawthorne’s action, concluding: “This matter should have been brought before the bankruptcy 
court for violation of its own order.  This was the exclusive province of the bankruptcy court.”401  
2.  Halas v. Platek:402 
Another jurisdictional issue was raised in Halas v. Platek,403 where the court held that 
only bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to impose sanctions for violating the stay.404  In that 
case, a state court lawsuit had been instigated against the debtor a few days pre-petition.405  The 
debtor was allegedly unaware of this court action when he filed Chapter 13 petition.406  While 
the stay was in effect, the state court rendered a default judgment against the debtor.407  
Approximately a month afterwards, the debtor informed the plaintiff’s attorney of the 
bankruptcy, apparently for the first time.408  The debtor’s bankruptcy case was dismissed and 
closed a few months later.409  
The plaintiff’s attorney in the state court action subsequently transferred the file to a 
second attorney to enforce the judgment, and the second attorney caused the debtor’s wages to be 
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garnished.410  Roughly a year after the bankruptcy court had dismissed his Chapter 13 case, the 
debtor moved the state court to set aside the default judgment on the ground that the judgment 
had been rendered in violation of the stay, i.e., the state court had lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.411  The debtor requested the return of the monies collected and any other relief that 
the state court might deem just.412  The state court vacated its order.413  The state court believed 
that it had jurisdiction to decide that the stay had applied to the action that had been before it, 
although this jurisdictional issue was apparently not raised.414  The state court, however, denied 
any further relief and ordered the debtor to pay the fees of the two attorneys.415   
The debtor then returned to the bankruptcy court seeking sanctions against the two 
attorneys under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) for willfully violating the stay.416  The bankruptcy court 
reopened the case for the limited purpose of considering the Section 362(h) claim and then 
denied the debtor’s motion on res judicata grounds.417  The debtor had sought equivalent relief in 
the state tribunal, praying not only for the returns of the monies collected, but also for any other 
relief that the state court might deem just and equitable.418  In other words, the debtor had asked 
the state court, in effect, to impose sanctions for violating the stay.419  Having failed to obtain all 
that he wanted in the state forum, the debtor was precluded from relitigating his claim in the 
bankruptcy court.   
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On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that the state court had no jurisdiction to 
impose sanctions for violating the stay.420  Therefore, regardless of whether this defense had 
actually been alleged, the state court judgment could have no res judicata effect in a Section 
362(h) proceeding before the bankruptcy court.421 
The Halas422 district court pointed out that there was a dearth of legislative history concerning 11 
U.S.C. § 362(h).423  The one court of appeals to address the issue had suggested that bankruptcy 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction to impose sanctions for a stay violation under 11 U.S.C. § 
362(h).424  As the district court in Halas425 correctly perceived, however, the Seventh Circuit’s 
statements in Martin- Trigona v. Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,426 were only dicta, and, 
moreover, the Seventh Circuit may have confused 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), which grants bankruptcy 
courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, with 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), 
which grants bankruptcy courts original, but not exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings arising 
in or under the Bankruptcy Code, and over proceedings related to a bankruptcy case.427 
The Halas428 district court observed that a few state courts had addressed the issue.429  Of the two 
that had discussed the matter at greatest lengths, the Hawthorne430 court had concluded that 
bankruptcy courts alone have jurisdiction to impose sanctions for a stay violation, while the 
Powell,431 court had decided that 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) creates a federal cause of action, but that 
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such an action may be prosecuted in a state as well as a bankruptcy court.432  Ultimately, the 
Halas433 district court found the reasoning in Hawthorne434 more persuasive.435   
The Halas436 district court was correct in holding that only bankruptcy courts have 
jurisdiction to impose sanctions for stay violations, whether under Section 362(h) or 
otherwise.437  In reaching this conclusion, however, the district court relied on two related and 
complementary, but nonetheless distinct lines of authority and reasoning, seemingly without 
realizing the difference.438  On the one hand, exclusive jurisdiction over stay violations is 
essential to protect the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the bankruptcy estate and 
its property.439  On the other, the automatic stay is equivalent to an order of the bankruptcy court, 
and it has long been settled that only the court whose authority had been violated, has 
jurisdiction to impose sanctions on the offending party.440   
 
Analysis supporting the view that bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction to impose 
sanctions for violation of the automatic stay: 
1.  Bankruptcy court’s exclusive control over the case and the property of the estate 
A bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case as per 28 U.S.C. § 
1334(a).441  It also has exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the debtor as per 28 U.S.C. § 
1334(e).442  The automatic stay functions to preserve and enforce that exclusive jurisdiction and 
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to bring all claims under the oversight of one forum.443  The strong implication is that bankruptcy 
courts must have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the stay through sanctions in order to maintain 
its exclusive jurisdiction over the case and over the estate property.444  This appears to be the 
reasoning behind the dicta in Martin- Trigona445, which the Halas446 district court cited.447  
Several state courts have either held or opined that bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over proceedings under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) on these grounds.448 
A number of decisions of the federal court seem to support this view.  In Gonzales v. 
Parks,449 the Ninth Circuit held that a state court was without jurisdiction to entertain a creditor’s 
claim that the debtor’s filing of a bankruptcy petition constituted an abuse of process.450  Such a 
proceeding would amount to a collateral attack on the petition itself and undermine the 
bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the case.451  The Gonzales452 court stated, “A 
congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts includes the implied power to 
protect that grant.”453  Following Gonzales,454 the court in Koffman v. Ostioimplant Technology, 
Inc.,455 held that a corporation against which an involuntary Chapter 7 petition had been filed 
could not maintain state law claims against an offending creditor either for filing an improper 
petition or for allegedly violating the automatic stay.456  Because of exclusive federal control 
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over bankruptcy, remedies had to be provided solely by federal law.457  The Sixth Circuit, in 
Accord Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,458 held that there is no state law cause of action for 
violating the stay; federal law preempts any state law in this regard.459  Moreover, federal courts 
must have exclusive jurisdiction over stay violations in order to maintain uniformity.460 
2.  Only the court whose authority has been violated or disobeyed can impose sanctions for 
such a violation or disobeyance 
At a broader level, it has long been settled that only the court whose authority has been 
flouted may impose sanctions for the violation, particularly by way of civil contempt 
proceedings.461  Jurisdiction to sanction by way of civil contempt or any analogous method rests 
exclusively with the court whose authority was ignored or whose orders were violated.462   
The automatic stay is not an “order” of the bankruptcy court.463  The stay takes effect by 
operation of law; an affirmative act by the bankruptcy court is required to lift or modify the 
stay.464  Nonetheless, the stay is usually treated as equivalent to a bankruptcy court injunction, 
and certainly only the bankruptcy court in which the case is pending has original jurisdiction to 
grant relief from the stay.465  The Gruntz466 court stated : “The automatic stay is an injunction 
issuing from the authority of the bankruptcy court, and bankruptcy court orders are not subject to 
collateral attacks in other courts.467   
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11 U.S.C. § 362(h) was enacted in 1984 in order to make it easier for an aggrieved debtor 
to recover for a stay violation; the standards governing a claim under Section 362(h) are not as 
strict as in a proceeding under Section 105(a).468  For one thing, clear and convincing evidence is 
required in a civil contempt proceeding whereas most courts hold that the standard proof under 
Section 362(h) is merely preponderance of evidence.469  Moreover, some courts require proof of 
bad faith before they will impose sanctions under Section 105(a).470  There is another difference 
as well.  Although a debtor or any aggrieved party with standing may seek sanction under 
Section 105(a), there is a split of authority as to who may invoke Section 362(h).471  The great 
weight of authority, however, holds that Section 362(h) speaks of an “individual” aggrieved by a 
stay violation, and that this term refers only to a natural person.472  Corporate debtors or other 
entities that are not natural persons must seek to vindicate their rights under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) if 
the stay is violated.473   
Although a proceeding to obtain sanctions under Section 362(h) may differ from a 
proceeding under Section 105(a), the two server similar objectives, and both are functionally 
equivalent to civil contempt actions for violating the automatic stay, which is treated as a court 
order for relevant purposes.474  Indeed, there is nothing to prevent an individual debtor from 
seeking to vindicate his or her rights under both statutes.475  Once this is understood, the 
principles laid down in Ex parte Bradley 476 and Gray v. Petoseed Co., Inc.,477 immediately come 
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into play.478  A state court has no more authority to entertain an action under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), 
which clearly applies only in bankruptcy courts.479  A state court simply has no jurisdiction to 
vindicate the dignity or authority of a bankruptcy court, no matter what theory may be used.480   
The best reasoned state court decisions have adopted this position.481  The Hawthorne482 court 
stated: “The bankruptcy court has the power to control its own proceedings and to punish for 
contempt any violations of Section 362…..The bankruptcy court has the responsibility to 
determine the effects of its own stay and to enforce its own orders….Similarly, in Oklahoma, the 
power of a state court to punish for contempt lies exclusively in the court whose order was 
violated.”483  Likewise the court in Ramdharry v. Gurrer484 succinctly held:  “This is a matter 
which should be determined by the Bankruptcy Court, not the state court.  An award of monetary 
damages under Section 362(h) for a violation of a court order is rightfully within the jurisdiction 
of the Court whose order was violated.”485 
The Halas486 court cited both Hawthorne487 and Ramdharry488 with approval and placed 
particular reliance on Hawthorne.489  This line of cases focusing on a court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction to impose sanctions for violations of its own orders and to vindicate the integrity of 
its own proceedings ultimately provides the strongest support for the district court’s decision in 
Halas.490  The exclusive jurisdiction of any court to impose civil penalties for violation of its 
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own authority leads to the conclusion that only bankruptcy court may impose sanctions for a stay 
violation, whether under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) or 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).491 
 
(c)  Issues Pertaining To The Repossession Of The Debtor’s Property (By The Creditor) 
Before Filing Of The Bankruptcy Petition-   
Another type of automatic stay dispute has arisen particularly in the context of consumer 
bankruptcies.492  A matter related to this that has continued to generate controversy is whether a 
creditor that has lawfully repossessed a debtor’s property before the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition (pre-petition), violates the automatic stay by simply retaining possession of that property 
after the automatic stay comes into effect, until adequate protection is offered.493   
In In re Diamond Indus. Corp.,494 there was a split of authority as to whether merely 
retaining possession amounts to “exercising control” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).495  
Section 362(a)(3) provides that any act to obtain property of the estate is expressly subject to the 
automatic stay.496  
“Under existing law, it may be unclear whether a creditor in rightful possession of a 
debtor’s property at the outset of a bankruptcy case must return the property in the absence of 
adequate protection.”497  Some courts have held that the creditor has an absolute duty to turn 
over the property regardless of adequate protection, and hence that the creditor violates the 
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automatic stay if this is not done.498  Others have held that merely retaining the property does not 
violate the stay and that the creditor has no duty to surrender the property until adequate 
protection is given.499 
There are at least four instances in which such disputes might not arise.500  First, if the 
debtor had lost all rights in the property pre-petition, the repossessing creditor would not violate 
the stay by retaining or disposing of the property after the bankruptcy petition is filed (post-
petition).501  For example, if the debtor had been leasing a vehicle under a contract that was a 
true lease and not a disguised security arrangement, and if the debtor had defaulted and the lessor 
had taken possession of the vehicle, and if there were no contractual or statutory right for the 
debtor lessee to cure his or her default after repossession, then the debtor lessee would have lost 
all rights in the property.502  In that case, the lessor would not violate the stay by retaining or 
selling the item post-petition.503   
Second, and conversely, if the secured creditor has lawfully repossessed the property 
before the petition, but if the debtor still has rights in the property when the petition is filed, such 
as legal title and/or a right of redemption, then the bankruptcy estate would succeed to the 
debtor’s rights under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).504  In that case, there would be no disagreement that the 
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creditor would violate the stay if it sold the property or otherwise purported to cut off the 
debtor’s rights without first obtaining relief from the stay.505 
Third, a creditor does not violate the stay if there is a specific statutory exception.506  For 
example, if a debtor has been unable to pay for repairs to a vehicle, if applicable state law allows 
for a possessory artisan’s lien, and if the creditor has lawfully retained possession before the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition, pursuant to the artisan’s lien statute, then 11 U.S.C. § 
362(b)(3)507 shields the creditor if it continues to retain the vehicle post-petition and to assert its 
rights under the lien.508 
Fourth, in In re U.S. Physicians, Inc.,509 the court held that a creditor that has wrongfully 
repossessed the property pre-petition, does not violate the stay by refusing to return the property 
post-petition.510  In such a case, the estate acquires the debtor’s right to maintain an action for 
replevin, conversion, trespass to chattels, or breach of the underlying contract, but the estate does 
not necessarily automatically acquire property itself.511  The rationale is that a refusal to undo a 
pre-petition wrong, without more, is not a violation of the stay.512 
The real dispute is over whether a creditor who has lawfully repossessed the debtor’s 
property pre-petition must turn the property over post- petition, even without adequate 
protection, and whether the creditor violates the stay by simply retaining the property until 
adequate protection is granted.513  The Eleventh Circuit, in In re Lewis514 has held that, under 
Alabama law, a default terminates all of the debtor’s rights under a secured installment sale 
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contract.515  The debtor no longer has any rights in the collateral.516  Thus, according to the 
Eleventh Circuit, a creditor that had lawfully taken possession before the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition would not violate the stay by refusing to turn over the property post-petition.517  
However, a district court in Florida has held that, under Florida law, title to a vehicle passes upon 
default and possession.518  Thus, even if the debtor retains a right of redemption, this, without 
more, is not sufficient to make the vehicle estate property, and a creditor, therefore, would not 
violate the stay by retaining the vehicle.519  The bankruptcy courts in In re Regan520has followed 
this decision while the courts in In re Shannarah521 and in In re Baker522 have rejected it.523  
Typically, the dispute over whether a creditor who has lawfully repossessed property pre-
petition must turn the property over post-petition, (even without the grant of adequate 
protection), and whether the creditor violates the stay by simply retaining the property until 
adequate protection is granted, arises in consumer cases, and normally the repossessed property 
is a motor vehicle.524  Often, the adequate protection controversy involves whether the debtor 
must maintain insurance on the vehicle, in addition to whether the debtor must make payments to 
the secured creditor, before the creditor is required to return the property.525 
Many courts, perhaps a majority, have held that the repossessing secured creditor must 
turn over the property upon demand, even without adequate protection, if the debtor still holds 
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legal title and if there is still a right to cure.526  If the creditor fails to do so, the creditor will be in 
violation of the stay.527   
A discussion of some of the relevant cases in this regard follows: 
1.  In re Knaus528 
In this case, which was brought before the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the 
Appellant had argued that the Appellee had violated the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 
362 when it failed, upon Appellant’s filing for bankruptcy, to voluntarily turn over grain and 
equipment it had previously taken from the appellant.529  Appellee had argued that it had no 
obligation to turn over property, because it had taken the property before the petition was filed 
and the stay imposed.530  The bankruptcy court had held that the creditor violated the automatic 
stay of section 362 of the code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, by not voluntarily returning the property after 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition.531  On appeal, the district court, however, held that the 
failure to voluntarily turn over property taken lawfully before the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition was not a violation of the automatic stay provisions.532     
The Eighth Circuit, reversed the judgment, holding that Appellee’s failure, upon 
Appellant’s filing for bankruptcy, to voluntarily turn over property taken before the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition violated the stay.533  The court held that Appellant was entitled to punitive 
damages because Appellee’s conduct was willful and egregious.534  The court stated that it failed 
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to see any distinction between a failure to return property taken before the stay and a failure to 
return the property taken after the stay.535  In both cases, the law clearly required turnover.536  
 The Supreme Court in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc537 had made a distinction in 
this regard, in that property seized, but not yet sold before the filing of the bankruptcy petition 
was the property of the estate, subject to turnover requirements of section 542.538  The Eighth 
Circuit argued that the duty to turn over the property was not contingent upon any predicate 
violation of the stay, any order of the bankruptcy court, or any demand by the creditor.539  
Rather, the duty would arise upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition.540  The court held that the 
failure to fulfill that duty, regardless of whether the original seizure was lawful, constituted a 
prohibited attempt to “exercise control over the property of the estate” in violation of the 
automatic stay.541   
The court cited late Chief Bankruptcy Judge Stewart’s opinion on remand: “ The principle is 
simply this: that a person holding property of a debtor who files bankruptcy proceedings 
becomes obligated, upon discovering the existence of the bankruptcy proceedings, to return that 
property to the debtor (in chapter 11 or chapter 13 proceedings) or his trustee (in chapter 7 
proceedings).  Otherwise, persons who could make no substantial claim to a debtor’s property in 
their possession could, without costs to themselves, compel the debtor or his trustee to bring suit 
as a prerequisite to returning the property, the powers of a bankruptcy court and its officers to 
collect the estate for the benefit of creditors would be vastly reduced.  The general creditors, for 
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whose benefit the return of property is sought, would have needlessly to bear the cost of its 
return. And those who unjustly retain possession of such property might do so with impunity.”542 
2. In re Brooks543  
 In this case, the dealership had repossessed the debtors’ car on June 20, 1996.544  On June 
20, 1996, the debtors filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and started an adversary proceeding 
seeking turnover of the car.545  That day, their attorney requested the dealership to return the 
car.546  The dealership demanded proof of insurance, which was provided on June 28, 1996.547  
The dealership told the debtors that they could pick up the car from a lot about 40 miles away, 
but the lot closed for the weekend.548  The debtors had their car towed back and rented a car 
while the dealership was in possession.549  Granting the motion in part, the court explained that 
the unsecured creditors should not have been called to pay the cost of transporting the vehicle 
back to the debtor.550  By making the car available in 40 miles away, the dealership failed to 
fulfill its responsibility of returning the car to the debtors’ possession.551  The court held the 
response time unreasonable, and three days would have been reasonable.552 
       The court noted that the dealership’s duty was not dependent on proof of insurance.553 
     The court found a willful violation, requiring an award of costs.554  However, finding no 
egregious conduct, the court awarded no punitive damages.555   
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       In arriving at its conclusion, the court stated: “[T]he filing of a bankruptcy petition 
imposes automatically a stay upon most actions by creditors to satisfy their claims against the 
debtor (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)). Section 542 provides that an entity, including a secured creditor, 
who possesses property of the debtor at the time the debtor files a bankruptcy petition shall 
deliver to the trustee, an account, for such property or the value of such property, unless such 
property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.”556  However, the court did not 
explain as to what kind of property could be considered inconsequential. The court further held 
that the collateral should be returned to the locale of repossession.557  The court noted the 
bankruptcy court’s holding in In re Belcher,558 where the creditors had repossessed the vehicle 
not knowing that the debtor had filed for bankruptcy.559  The Belcher560 court held that although 
the repossession occurred from the debtor’s failure to notify the creditor of the bankruptcy filing, 
the creditor had a duty to return the vehicle to the place from where it was taken.561   
      Following are a few cases in which the courts have held that the creditor does not violate the stay 
by merely retaining possession of any vehicle or other property, and that the creditor is under no 
obligation to turn over the property unless and until the court so orders and adequate protection is 
provided: 
     1.  In re Fitch562 
 The debtor, in this case, had purchased a car on credit and defaulted on the obligation.563  
The secured creditor then repossessed the car.564  The debtor then filed her Chapter 13 
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bankruptcy petition and demanded that the secured creditor return the car.565  The secured 
creditor refused to return the car absent showing of adequate protection in the form of 
insurance.566  The debtor filed a motion for sanctions against the secured creditors for the 
retention of the car after receiving notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition, which was 
denied.567   
  The court referred to several decisions568 in the past determining that the secured creditor 
was not required to immediately turn over the car.569  In re Schwartz570 and in In re Stringer571 
the respective courts had held that only if the repossession takes place post-petition, it would 
violate the automatic stay and would, thus, be void and of no effect.572  The Fitch 573court, 
arrived at a similar conclusion stating that the repossession of the car was not a violation of the 
stay since it had occurred pre-petition.574  According to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), the automatic stay 
prohibits, inter alia, any act “to exercise control over the property of the estate.”575   The debtor, 
in this case, had argued that by retaining the car, the creditor violated subsection (a)(3) because 
retaining the car was an “act” to “exercise control over the property of the estate.”576  The court, 
however, found that the right to possess the car was not property of the estate and thus, it did not 
find necessary to reach the issue of whether the retention of the car was an “act.”   
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 In  In re Richardson,577 the court held that a violation of § 362(a)(3) required an 
affirmative act and that retention of a car repossessed pre- petition was not such an act.578  The 
court, in holding that the right to possess the car was not property of the estate, argued that 
Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which defines property, states that it includes “all legal 
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”579  The 
court further explained that this provision was not intended to expand the debtor’s rights against 
others more than they existed at the commencement of the case, and thus whatever rights the 
debtor had in property at the commencement of the case, continued in bankruptcy, no more, no 
less.580  The court stated that property rights were to be determined under state law,581 and 
applying the relevant law of the state of California, the court determined that the right to possess 
the car was not among the property interests which became property of the estate; and thus 
creditors acts to exercise control over the right to possess the car did not violate the stay.582  The 
court concluded that “[T]he car was and remained the property of the estate, and repossession did 
not change that.  The right to possess the car, however, was transferred from the debtor to the 
creditor prior to the filing of the petition.  Since the debtor did not have the unfettered right to 
possession at the time the petition was filed, the unfettered right to possession did not become 
property of the estate.  Thus, the creditor’s refusal to return the car did not amount to a violation 
of the stay.”583 
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3.  In re Spears584 
 In this case, the debtor had purchased a vehicle under a retail installment contract and had 
financed it through the motor company.585  The debtor failed to make any payments on the 
vehicle and the company repossessed it.586  The debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition 
and sought for the return of the vehicle.587  This case raised two issues: (i) First, in connection 
with the debtor’s claim for return of the vehicle, the creditor argued that the debtor did not 
possess sufficient property interest in the vehicle, such that turn over could be ordered.588  
Second, the creditor contended that sanctions under § 362(h) were not required in the case as it 
had not violated the automatic stay in refusing to return the vehicle after receiving notice of the 
debtor’s Chapter 13 filing.589 
 Citing In re Johnson,590  this court noted that turn over was a remedy to obtain what was 
acknowledged to be property of the bankruptcy estate.591  As a result of this, if the debtor did not 
have an interest in property at the commencement of the bankruptcy case, turnover could not be 
ordered.592   
 The Spears593 court referenced the decision of the Supreme Court in Whiting Pools,594 
where the Court had determined that turnover could be ordered in cases where, prior to the 
commencement of reorganization proceedings, property of a Chapter 11 debtor had been 
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repossessed by a secured creditor.595  Although an order under § 542(a) modifies a creditor’s 
procedural rights available to protect and satisfy its lien, the Court reasoned that the creditor’s 
rights under the Bankruptcy Code, including the right to adequate protection, replaced the 
protection afforded the creditor by its repossession remedy.596  In addition, the Whiting Pools597 
decision had commented that a rehabilitation of a debtor’s business was facilitated if property 
subject to creditors’ security interests was included in the reorganization estate.598 The Supreme 
Court noted that its analysis depended in part on the reorganization context before it, and the 
court left open the question whether § 542(a) would have the same broad effect in liquidation or 
adjustment of debt proceedings.599  The Spears600 court noted that under the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”) as adopted in most states, after repossession, the debtor’s interest in 
the vehicle is a right to redeem the vehicle.601  The court distinguished its holding from the one 
in Charles R. Hall Motors v, Inc v. Lewis602 by the Eleventh Circuit court in that Lewis603 court 
had reached its result (under the law of Alabama) by finding that a right of redemption is not a 
sufficient property interest to warrant turnover of a repossessed vehicle.604  The Spears court 
looked to Illinois law discussing the nature of a debtor’s interest in a repossessed vehicle.605  As 
under the Alabama cases, the Illinois Appellate Court had found that legal title to property 
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subject to a security interest passes to a secured creditor after it takes possession following 
default.606 
 As to the question whether a creditor violated the stay by refusing to turn over a debtor’s 
vehicle that is repossessed prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the critical question before 
the court was whether turnover could be ordered before findings as to adequate protection were 
made.607  The court referred to the bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Young,608 where the court 
stated that the passive act of continuing to possess property did not fall within the prohibition 
under § 362(h).609  If a vehicle had been lawfully repossessed pre- petition, the creditor would 
have a right to possess the vehicle on the date the debtor filed for bankruptcy.610  Since the 
purpose of the automatic stay is to maintain the status quo that existed on the date of a debtor’s 
bankruptcy filing, the creditor should not have to turn over the vehicle absent assurance that its 
pre- petition position would be protected.611  The decision in Young612 commented that if § 
362(a)(3) were interpreted as requiring immediate turnover, it would represent a dramatic shift 
from the pre-Code practice of allowing secured creditors to retain repossessed collateral until 
adequate protection was provided by the debtor.613   
 Importantly, too, it would contravene the statutory scheme under § § 363(e) and 542(a) to 
find that a creditor has an affirmative duty to turn over collateral repossessed prior to 
bankruptcy.614  Section 542(a) also limited turnover of property that could be used under § 
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363.615  Under § 363(e) the creditor could obtain an order prohibiting a proposed use of the 
property unless the estate provided adequate protection.616  This constituted a significant defense 
to the grant of a turnover order under § 542(a).617  The defense would be abrogated by an 
interpretation of § 362(a)(3) requiring turnover without permitting invocation of the defense.618  
Such an approach would be contrary to the logical interaction of § § 363(e) and 542(a).619  The 
burden would be on the trustee, when the issue would be raised, to prove adequate protection 11 
U.S.C. § 363(o)(1).620  Logically, therefore, the creditor should be entitled to hold onto the 
property during the pendency of the § 542 action until adequate protection question is 
resolved.621  The obvious rationale implicit in permitting the secured creditor to retain possession 
of the seized property while opposing turnover under § 542(a) is that the creditor may suffer the 
very harm that adequate protection is designed to avoid if the property is turned over to the 
trustee before the trustee proves that the creditor is being given the adequate protection to which 
it is entitled.622   
 An excellent exposition of the competing points of view is given in the majority and the 
dissenting opinions in In re Sharon.623  The majority espoused the position that a creditor who 
has repossessed pre-petition violates the stay by refusing to surrender the property, even if no 
adequate has been offered.624  11 U.S.C. § 363(a)(3) prohibits “any act to obtain possession of 
property of the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate” once a petition is filed.625 
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If, under applicable non-bankruptcy law, the debtor still holds legal title to the property or a right 
of redemption, the property becomes the property of the estate.626  Anyone holding property as of 
the petition date is obliged to turn it over pursuant to § 542(a), even if the debtor would not 
necessarily have a right to immediate possession under non-bankruptcy law.627  The Sharon628 
majority thus concluded that retaining possession of the repossessed property violates the stay.629  
There is nothing in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) that creates an exception to the stay if the creditor does 
not have adequate protection, and there is nothing in 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) that conditions turnover 
on adequate protection.630  If a repossessing creditor wants adequate protection or relief from the 
stay, the creditor may seek it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) and/or § 362(f), but a creditor is not 
free to engage in self-help by retaining the property on its own initiative until adequate 
protection is provided, or by deciding by itself whether there is adequate protection.631   
 In a well argued dissent, Judge Stosberg expounded the competing view.632  The stay is 
designed to freeze the status quo as of the petition date, and hence a mere passive retention of 
property lawfully in the creditor’s possession is not an “act” to obtain possession or exercise 
control over property of the estate in contravention of 11 U.S.C. § 363(a)(3).633  While nothing in 
11 U.S.C. § 542(a) expressly requires a debtor to provide adequate protection as a precondition 
to turnover, neither does anything in 11 U.S.C. § 362 make it wrongful for a creditor to retain 
collateral legitimately in its possession merely because a bankruptcy petition has been filed.634  
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Hence, Judge Stosberg concluded, that a creditor is entitled to retain the vehicle or other 
collateral until the question of adequate protection is resolved.635 
 Two subsequent decisions, In re Barringer636 and In re Bernstein637 followed the 
reasoning of Judge Stosberg’s dissent.638  The majority opinion and Judge Stosberg’s dissent in 
Sharon639 provide cogent reasoning for the opposing points of view, both at the level of statutory 
interpretation and of policy analysis.640  As the split of authority shows, the relevant statutes 
appear to be ambiguous in this context, and the controversy is likely to continue.641 
 
Proposed legislative solutions: 
Legislation considered in the 106th Congress in 1999 would have resolved the dispute in favor of 
the repossessing creditor.642  Section 135 of H.R. 833 would have added a new Section 1307A to 
Chapter 13.643  The proposed statute would have provided that, if a purchase money secured 
lender or a lessor of personal property had properly obtained possession of the property pre-
petition, the creditor would be allowed to retain the property until it received adequate protection 
payments.644  Such payments would have to be in the amount and frequency of the payments 
required in the underlying contract, unless the court, upon request, ordered lesser amounts or a 
different frequency.645  The payments, however, could never be less frequent than monthly, and 
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the amount could be no less than the depreciation of the collateral.646  In addition, the debtor 
would be required to show that the property was insured no later than 60 days after the petition 
was filed.647  Thus, the proposed legislation would have established the views expressed by 
Judge Stosberg’s dissent in Sharon.648 
 Currently, a modified version of this proposal is included in H.R. 333 and in S. 420.  The 
legislation now under consideration in the 107th Congress has eliminated the addition of a new 
Section 1307A to the Bankruptcy Code, and neither bill says anything explicitly about the rights 
of a secured creditor or a lessor of personal property that has lawfully taken possession of the 
property pre-petition.649  Nonetheless, Section 309 of H.R. 333 and Section 309 of S. 420 would 
amend Section 1326(a) of Chapter 13 so as to require the debtor to make adequate protection 
payments within 30 days of the order for relief or within 30 days of the filing of a plan, 
whichever occurred sooner.650  Moreover, within 60 days of the petition date, the debtor would 
have to show that the property was adequately insured.651  These provisions would apply in all 
cases involving repossession.652   
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VII. CONCLUSIONS: 
 As the dissent in the two panel opinions in Gruntz I653 and Gruntz II654 correctly 
observed, the chief concern of the majority appeared to be that allowing state courts to interpret 
the scope and applicability of the automatic stay would lead to unwarranted state court 
interference with bankruptcy administration, and to a plethora of state court judgments that 
would undermine orderly liquidation or reorganization.  However, in the dissenting opinions in 
these two cases, Judge Fletcher displayed a deep concern with comity and federalism.  State 
courts have jurisdiction to interpret and apply federal law unless Congress has deprived them of 
that right.655  Federal courts should not purport to oust state courts of jurisdiction unless such a 
step is absolutely necessary to protect exclusive federal jurisdiction.656  In fact, from a practical 
point of view, the decisions in Gruntz657 could lead to strange consequences.  For example, if an 
action were brought against the debtor in a state court, and if the state court determined that the 
stay did not apply, and went forward to render judgment in the debtor’s favor, the judgment 
would have no binding effect because the state court would have had no jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the threshold jurisdictional issue of the stay’s applicability.658  The adverse party 
could bring another similar action in the bankruptcy court, or, if the action had been one over 
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which the bankruptcy court would have had no jurisdiction, the adverse party could seek relief 
form the stay and then go back to the original forum for a return match.659 
The approach taken in Singleton,660Siskin,661 and Glass662 therefore, seems to be far more 
coherent than the views expressed in Gruntz.663 Simply as a practical matter, holding that state 
courts have no jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies could lead to all sorts of 
difficulties.664  Thus, in my point of view, the best approach to deal with this issue of state court 
jurisdiction to determine applicability of the stay, would be for the aggrieved party to seek 
review before the state appellate courts, and ultimately, before the United States Supreme court.  
Federal courts should not be given the authority to determine whether state courts have 
jurisdiction when the automatic stay is at issue. 
The issue of a non- bankruptcy tribunal’s jurisdiction to impose sanctions for a violation 
of the stay has not arisen frequently.  Moreover, the weight of authority holds that, even if a state 
court or other federal court has jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies, only the 
bankruptcy court where the case is pending has jurisdiction to call a party to task for violating 
the stay.665  On the one hand, exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction over stay violation is essential to 
protect the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the bankruptcy estate and its property. 
On the other, it has long been settled that only the court whose authority has been violated has 
jurisdiction to impose sanctions on the offending party.  Thus, state courts should not entertain 
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any claims involving sanctions for stay violations, and the same should remain within the 
exclusive realm of federal courts.   
 With respect to the issue as to whether repossession by creditor of debtor’s property pre-
petition, amounts to stay violation, legislation considered in the 106th Congress, which is 
discussed in detail above, would have resolved the dispute in favor of the repossessing creditor.  
Currently, a modified version of this proposal, included in H.R. 333 and in S. 420, which is also 
discussed in detail above, is now under consideration in 107th Congress.  However, the 
legislation is silent whether the creditor could retain repossessed property until adequate 
protection payments were made.  Presumably, however, Section 309 of H.R. 333 and of S. 420 
would make it easier for creditors to argue that they should be allowed to retain repossessed 
property until the debtor has fulfilled the statutory duties, and that a failure by a debtor to do so 
should be grounds of relief from the stay.  Judge Stosberg’s dissent and the majority opinion in 
Sharon666 provide cogent reasoning for the opposing points of view, both at the level of statutory 
interpretation, and of policy analysis.  As the split of authority shows, the relevant statutes appear 
to be ambiguous in this context, and the controversy is likely to continue. 
A provision in the above pending legislation making it mandatory on the part of the repossessing 
creditor to return the property, within a specific period of time, once adequate protection 
payments are made is likely to solve the above issue.  This rule should be applicable even in 
cases of unsecured creditors, so as to ensure the benefit of all creditors. 
 
  
 
                                                 
666
 Sharon, 234 B.R. 676 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 1999). 
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